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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-THE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING CONTROL
ACT-LEGAL STATUS OF TOWNSHIPS-The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania held that the "incorporated municipality" exception is not
available to billboards erected in townships.
Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 620
A.2d 1125 (Pa. 1993).
In 1989, Patrick Media Group, Inc. ("Patrick Media") applied to
the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("PennDOT") for
a permit to erect an outdoor advertising sign on property located
in Ohio Township.1 The proposed commercial advertisement would
have been located within 600 feet of the nearest edge of the right-
of-way of Interstate 279.2 Pursuant to the Outdoor Advertising
Control Act of 1971, 3 PennDOT denied Patrick Media's applica-
tion for a permit.4
The Outdoor Advertising Control Act of 1971 ("OAC Act") pro-
hibits the construction of outdoor advertising devices 5 within 660
feet of the right-of-way of interstate highways.6 The OAC Act con-
tains an exception, however, that allows signs to be erected in com-
1. Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 597 A.2d 274, 275 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991), rev'd, 620 A.2d 1125 (Pa. 1993). Permit applications for outdoor adver-
tising devices are governed by 67 PA. CODE § 445.6 (1992).
2. Patrick Media, 597 A.2d at 275. Interstate 279 is a portion of the national system
of interstate and defense highways, as officially designated by the United States Secretary of
Transportation.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.101 (Supp. 1993).
4. Patrick Media, 597 A.2d at 275.
5. Section 2718.103 (5) of the OAC Act provides that "Outdoor Advertising Device
shall mean any outdoor sign, display, light, figure, painting, drawing, message, plaque,
poster, billboard or other thing which is designed, intended or used to advertise or inform."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.103(5) (Supp. 1993).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.104 (1993). The OAC Act was a legislative response
to the Federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1965). The Federal
Highway Beautification Act was intended to protect the public investment in the interstate
and primary highway system, to promote the safety and recreational value of public travel,
and to preserve our nation's natural beauty. Patrick Media, 597 A.2d at 276. It provided the
United States Secretary of Transportation with authority to reduce by ten percent the
amount of federal-aid highway funds being allocated to states that have not limited the
construction of advertising signs within 660 feet of the right-of-way of interstate and pri-
mary highways. Id.
The OAC Act was intended by the Pennsylvania legislature to protect the common-
wealth's interest in receiving federal-aid funds, and, at the same time, to further the na-
tional policy of highway beautification. Id. at 277. Its primary goal was to limit the prolifera-
tion of advertising signs and billboards alongside the commonwealth's highways. Id.
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mercially or industrially zoned areas within the boundaries of in-
corporated municipalities. 7 To qualify under the "incorporated
municipality" exception, the proposed billboard location must be
located within the boundaries of an "incorporated municipality" as
such boundaries existed on September 21, 1959.8 The exception re-
quires the applicant to consider the boundaries only as they ex-
isted on September 21, 1959, and to essentially disregard current
municipal boundaries.' If the proposed site was not located within
an "incorporated municipality" on September 21, 1959, then the
exception is unavailable.1"
In Patrick Media, the hearing officer held that on September 21,
1959, Ohio Township was a second-class township.11 The hearing
officer also ruled that the area of the proposed sign location was
zoned to be residential on September 21, 1959.12 Consequently, the
hearing officer issued an order denying Patrick Media's applica-
tion, concluding that the proposed sign did not qualify under the
exception to the OAC Act on the ground that second-class town-
ships are not "incorporated municipalities" according to PennDOT
regulations."3 The hearing officer also concluded that the proposed
sign did not qualify under the second exception because the pro-
posed location was within an area zoned residential on September
21, 1959.14
Patrick Media filed exceptions to the order, but PennDOT's Sec-
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.104(1)(v) (Supp. 1993).
8. Section 2718.104 provides in part:
To effectively control outdoor advertising, while recognizing it to be a legitimate com-
mercial use of property and an integral part of the business and marketing function,
no outdoor advertising device shall be erected or maintained: (1) Within six hundred
sixty (660) feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way if any part of the advertising
or informative contents is visible from the main-traveled way of an interstate high-
way or primary highway except:
(v) Outdoor advertising devices in areas zoned commercial or industrial along the
interstate system and lying within the boundaries of any incorporated municipality
as such boundaries existed on September 21, 1959 and devices located in any other
area which, as of September 21, 1959 was clearly established by law as industrial or
commercial.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.104 (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Patrick Media, 597 A.2d at 275.
12. Id.
13. Id. Section 445.2 of Pennsylvania Code chapter 67 defines "incorporated munici-
palities" as "cities of all classes, boroughs, towns and first-class townships." 67 PA. CODE
§445.2 (1992).
14. Patrick Media, 597 A.2d at 275.
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retary of Transportation denied the exceptions and affirmed the
order on August 22, 1990.15 Patrick Media appealed to the Com-
monwealth Court of Pennsylvania.16
The commonwealth court reversed the PennDOT order and held
that the exception was applicable on the basis that every "square
inch of property within the Commonwealth is located within incor-
porated municipalities. ' 17 PennDOT petitioned for allowance of
appeal and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted the
appeal.
1 8
The sole issue presented before the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania was whether Patrick Media's application to construct a sign
in an industrially zoned area of a second-class township (in this
case, Ohio Township) fell within the exception allowing signs to be
erected in an "incorporated municipality." 9 To resolve this issue,
the court was compelled to define what the General Assembly in-
tended when it used the term "incorporated municipality" in the
OAC Act.20
15. Id. Exception to any PennDOT hearing officer's report is made pursuant to 67
PA. CODE § 491.12 (1992).
16. Patrick Media, 597 A.2d at 276. On appeal, Patrick Media argued that PennDOT
had no "rational basis" to exclude second-class townships from the "incorporated munici-
pality" exception. Id.
17. Patrick Media, 597 A.2d at 274. The commonwealth court, in holding that sec-
ond-class townships are incorporated municipalities, focused upon the power of a township
to impose taxes, enact ordinances, file suits, convey property and enter contracts, as evi-
dence of its "corporate" existence. Id. at 277. The court stated that since "a second-class
township is as much an incorporated municipality as a first-class township," no rational
basis existed to exclude second-class townships from PennDOT's definition of "incorporated
municipality." Id. at 278. Therefore, PennDOT's regulatory definition of "incorporated mu-
nicipality" was held invalid. Id.
18. Patrick Media Group, Inc v. Department of Transp., 620 A.2d 1125 (Pa. 1993).
19. Patrick Media, 620 A.2d 1127. The exception, as noted, is PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36,
§ 2718.104(1)(v) (Supp. 1993).
20. Patrick Media, 620 A.2d at 1126. When Pennsylvania passed the OAC Act in
1971 the General Assembly used specific language adopted from the Federal Highway Beau-
tification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1965). This specific language included the use of the term
"incorporated municipality." Federal regulations enacted pursuant to the Federal Act are
nearly identical to the provisions used by the OAC Act. Patrick Media, 620 A.2d at 1128.
The federal exception states that the 660 feet requirement shall not apply: "to those seg-
ments of the Interstate System which transverse commercial or industrial zones within the
boundaries of incorporated municipalities, as such boundaries existed on September 21,
1959." 23 C.F.R. § 750.102(c)(3) (1993).
This statutory language is nearly identical to the OAC Act exception at § 2718.104(v).
However, the OAC Act did not define the term incorporated municipality. Patrick Media,
620 A.2d at 1126. Because the OAC Act did not define incorporated municipality, PennDOT
provided a definition in its regulation. Id. See note 13.
In Pennsylvania there are five general types of political subdivisions: counties, cities, bor-
oughs, townships and school districts. 109 THE PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL, 521, Dec. 1989.
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PennDOT argued that in construing the OAC Act provision in
question, reference should be made to the Statutory Construction
Act of 1972.21 PennDOT contended that the terms "incorporated
municipality" and "municipal corporation" refer interchangeably
to the same entity.2 The Statutory Construction Act contains a
clear definition of the term "municipal corporation" that provides:
"(1) When used in any statute finally enacted on or before Decem-
ber 31, 1974, a city, borough, or incorporated town. (2) When used
in any statute finally enacted on or after January 1, 1975, a city,
borough, incorporated town or township. "23
The OAC Act was enacted on December 15, 1971.24 Therefore,
PennDOT argued, reference should be made to the definition of
"municipal corporation" pertaining to statutes enacted before De-
cember 31, 1974.26 That definition explicitly excludes townships. 2 6
The court was uncomfortable with PennDOT's assertion that the
terms "municipal corporation" and "incorporated municipality"
were interchangeable.2 7 Townships have traditionally not been con-
sidered municipal corporations.28 The court noted, however, that
There is no legal entity known as an "incorporated municipality." Local governments in
Pennsylvania have traditionally been classified as either "municipal corporations" or "quasi-
municipal corporations," depending on their legislative charter or enabling statute. See In
Re: Milford, Middlecreek and Jefferson Boundary Line, 28 Somerset Legal J. 237, 238-39
(1973).
21. The Statutory Construction Act, 1972 Pa. Laws 1339, § 3 (codified at 1 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1901-1991 (Supp. 1993)).
22. Patrick Media, 620 A.2d at 1127.
23. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1991 (Supp. 1993).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §2718.101 (1993).
25. Patrick Media, 620 A.2d at 1127. Although the OAC Act was enacted on Decem-
ber 15, 1971, it was amended in December of 1975. Id. However, the amendments did not
change the provision presently at issue. Id. The Statutory Construction Act of 1972 provides
that, when a statute has been amended, the unaltered portions of the original statute are to
be construed as effective from the date of their original enactment. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1901 (Supp. 1993).
26. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1991 (Supp. 1993). This position is inconsistent with
the Department's own definition of "incorporated municipality." See note 13. By suggesting
definitions provided by the Statutory Construction Act, PennDOT encouraged the exclusion
of all townships from the "incorporated municipality" exception. It is unclear why
PennDOT presented an argument so inconsistent with its own regulatory definition.
27. Patrick Media, 620 A.2d at 1127.
28. Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cited Trevorton Water Supply Co. v.
Zerbe Township, 102 A. 328 (Pa. 1917), as an early case recognizing the quasi-corporate
existence of townships. Patrick Media, 620 A.2d at 1127. The court acknowledged that
townships have historically possessed quasi-corporate powers and therefore, for purposes of
the OAC Act, could be considered "incorporated." Id. However, the court rejected
PennDOT's contention that the terms "municipal corporation" and "incorporated munici-
pality" were interchangeable. Id. Instead, the court chose to define each term of "incorpo-
rated municipality" separately. Id.
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townships have obtained extensive corporate powers and today are
clearly "incorporated" political bodies. 29 Notwithstanding the cor-
porate status of townships, the court rejected PennDOT's argu-
ment that the definition of "municipal corporation," as defined in
the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, should be used to construe
the meaning of "incorporated municipality" in the OAC Act.3 0 In-
stead, the court utilized the definition of the term "municipality"
as set forth in the Statutory Construction Act to construe the
meaning of "incorporated municipality."" The Statutory Con-
struction Act defines "municipality" as follows: "(1) When used in
any statute finally enacted on or before December 31, 1974, a city,
borough or incorporated town.(2) When used in any statute finally
enacted on or after January 1, 1975, a county, city, borough, incor-
porated town or township.
'3 2
The court held that under the definition of the term "municipal-
ity" as set forth in the Statutory Construction Act, a township did
not qualify as a municipality for purposes of the OAC Act.3 3 Since
townships could not be regarded as municipalities, the court held
that townships could not be considered "incorporated municipali-
ties," despite their exercise of certain powers that are quasi-corpo-
rate in nature.34 Thus, the statutory provision 35 allowing signs to
be erected in an incorporated municipality was held to be inappli-
cable to all townships. 6 Patrick Media's application for a permit
was therefore denied and the decision of the commonwealth court
was subsequently reversed.
To better understand the Patrick Media decision, one would
benefit from looking at the history and jurisprudential develop-
ment of local government law. In America, the incorporation of lo-
cal communities into organized forms of government began in the
latter half of the seventeenth century. 7 Municipal corporations
were established by grants or charters by provincial colony gover-
29. Id. The court made reference to the township's powers to impose taxes, enact




32. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1991 (Supp. 1993).
33. Patrick Media, 620 A.2d at 1128.
34. Id.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.104(1)(v) (1993).
36. Patrick Media, 620 A.2d at 1128. By excluding all townships from the "incorpo-
rated municipality" exception, the court essentially invalidated PennDOT's regulatory
definition.
37. EUGENE McQuILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §1.09 (3d ed. 1987).
1994
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nors and were independent from the state legislatures. 8 These
early municipal corporations possessed limited powers of self-gov-
ernment and self-regulation."
After the American Revolution, the royal prerogative of charter-
granting passed from colonial governors to the state legislatures.40
It was at this time that an important distinction developed in cate-
gorizing local governmental units. Certain governmental bodies
were created solely to assist the state legislature in administrative
duties."1 Historically, it was impractical for a state to be governed
exclusively from the state capital.42 Therefore, geographic subdivi-
sions, such as counties-and townships, were created.43 These forms
of local government were known as "quasi-municipal
corporations. "144
Quasi-municipal corporations were not as powerful or as inde-
pendent as municipal corporations. 45 Quasi-municipal corporations
were considered "administrative agents" of the state and existed
merely to serve the state."' In other words, the quasi-municipal
corporation was a public agency created or authorized by the state
to aid the state in the administration of state-wide problems. 7
Municipal corporations, on the other hand, were created primarily
38. 1 SANDS & LIBONATI, LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 1.04 (1989). During the colonial
period, some twenty-four municipal corporations received charters as cities. Id. By 1750,
chartered municipal corporations lined the Atlantic seaboard and were created as an effec-
tive instrument for stimulating commercial development and promoting trade. Id.
39. SANDS & LIBONATI, cited at note 38, at §1.04. The colonial municipal corporations
had the authority to raise revenues by collecting import or sales duties, licensing fees, and
rents from the commercial facilities (wharves and markets) which it owned. Id.
40. Jewell Cass Phillips, Legal Position of Local Units of Government in Pennsylva-
nia, 13 TEMP. L.Q. 466 (1939).
41. 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 23
(Little, Brown, and Company 1881). Quasi-corporations, such as counties and townships,
were described as "involuntary political or civil divisions of the state" created merely to aid
in the administration of state government. Id.
42. OSBORNE REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 6 (1982).
43. REYNOLDS, cited at note 42; CHARLES B. ELLIOT, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10 (Callaghan and Company 1925). In sparsely populated areas,
where the need for a strong local government was minimal, quasi-municipal corporations
were found as the most convenient form of government. ELLIOT at § 10.
44. ELLIOT, cited at note 43, at § 10.
45. DILLON, cited at note 41, at § 29.
46. DILLON, cited at note 41, at § 30. As one commentator has stated: "A municipal
corporation proper is created mainly for the interest advantage and convenience of the lo-
cality and its people. . . . [a] county [or township] organization is created almost exclusively
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to serve local interests."'
The legal genesis of the municipal corporation is rooted in an-
cient Rome where the "municipium" was a free and privileged
town or city which had been granted the right of local self-govern-
ment and the broad power to create its own laws."9 In England,
and' later, America this power of self-government became the dis-
tinguishing characteristic of a municipal corporation." This broad
grant of local autonomy became the distinctive feature that segre-
gated municipal corporations from quasi-municipal corporations.
Throughout nineteenth-century America, only cities and boroughs
enjoyed this corporate autonomy.5 1
Pennsylvania law has traditionally recognized townships as
quasi-municipal corporations and not municipal corporations. Nu-
merous decisions have held that counties and townships are quasi-
municipal corporations with much less power and autonomy than
municipal corporations.2  In Kittaning Academy v. Brown,5" the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania attached considerable significance
to the fact that quasi-municipal corporations had no legislative
power and were governed directly by statutes passed in Harris-
burg.54 The court held that counties and townships can, as quasi-
48. In City of Williamsport v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 487 (1877), the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that:
A municipal corporation has for its object the interests, advantage and convenience of
the locality and its people. A municipal corporation is a government, possessing pow-
ers of legislation and is charged with a general care for the welfare of the people;
while a county organization is merely an involuntary agent of the state, charged with
the interest of the state ....
City of Williamsport, 84 Pa. at 499.
49. In Re: Milford, Middlecreek and Jefferson Boundary Line, 28 Somerset Legal J.
240 (1973).
50. Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109 (1857). The Ohio Supreme Court
held that quasi-municipal corporations, such as townships and counties, are mere "local
subdivisions of a state, created by the sovereign power of the state, without the particular
solicitation, consent or concurrent action of the people who inhabit them." Id. at 118-19.
Municipal corporations, on the other hand, are called into existence at the direct solicitation
or free consent of the people who compose them. Id. at 119.
51. In Shronk v. Supervisors of Penn Township, 3 Rawle 347 (1832), the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that townships were not municipal corporations but rather
quasi-corporations with limited corporate powers. Shronk, 3 Rawle at 350.
See also City of Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169 (1870), where the supreme court declared
that "the city of Philadelphia is beyond all question a municipal corporation, that is, a
public corporation created by the government. . . .[h]aving subordinate and local powers of
legislation." City of Philadelphia, 64 Pa. at 180.
52. Phillips, cited at note 40, at 466.
53. 41 Pa. 269 (1862).
54. Kittaning Academy, 41 Pa. at 272. At issue in Kittaning Academy was the legal
effect of a license issued by Armstrong County to erect a public building on land owned by
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municipal corporations, conduct affairs as would municipal corpo-
rations, but quasi-municipal corporations are limited because they
lack the authority to legislate.5 The Kittaning Academy holding
was consistent with the nineteenth-century notion that quasi-mu-
nicipal corporations were merely "geographically organized" agents
of the state and possessed only limited corporate powers.5
In the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania was asked to reaffirm the corporate status
of townships. Urban growth and industrialization had dramatically
changed the role of local governments. Recognizing the need for
greater control over local health and safety matters, the Pennsylva-
nia General Assembly passed the Township Act of 1899. 57 In
Trevorton Water Supply Co. v. Zerbe Township,58 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania refused to recognize townships as municipal
corporations despite their increased powers. 9
the county. Id. The supreme court held that the construction of an academy did not consti-
tute a public building and that Armstrong County had no legislative power to alter the
original grant which had devised the property to the county. Id.
55. Id. The court stated that "because they cannot legislate, everything done by the
agents of a county must be first authorized by the legislative power of the state." Id.
56. In Wharton v. School Directors of Cass Township, 42 Pa. 358 (1862), the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania enumerated that:
[S]chool districts are not strictly speaking, municipal corporations, for they have
neither common seal or legislative powers, both of which are characteristic of such
corporations. They are territorial divisions for the purposes of the common school
laws, consisting generally of boroughs and townships. They belong to that class of
quasi corporations to which counties and townships belong-exercising within a pre-
scribed sphere many of the faculties of a corporation.
Wharton, 42 Pa. at 363.
Also, in Union Township v. Gibboney, 94 Pa. 534 (1880), the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania held that townships are merely involuntary civil divisions of the state created to aid
the state in the administration of state government. Union Township, 94 Pa. at 536. In
addition, the court noted that "in respect to the limited number of their corporate powers,
they rank low in the grade of corporate existence; and hence, they have been frequently
termed quasi corporations." Id. at 536-37.
57. The Act of April 28, 1899, P.L. 104. The purpose of the Township Act of 1899 is
disclosed in the preamble of the Act: "In those more populous townships of the Common-
wealth, which are in large measure devoted to residential purposes, there is need of a form
of municipal government having greater powers than are now possessed by the local govern-
ments of townships under existing laws." 1899 Pa. Laws 104.
58. 259 Pa. 31 (1917).
59. Trevorton, 259 Pa. at 31. The supreme court also refused to confer municipal
corporation status on townships in Dempster v. Unified Traction Co., 205 Pa. 70 (1903). In
Dempster, the court stated that the Township Act of 1899 "[did] not attempt to create a
hybrid borough, neither township nor borough; it obviously intend[ed] to preserve the old
township organization with all its powers and duties except where it expressly enact[ed]
otherwise." Dempster, 259 Pa. at 78.
See also St. Davids Church v. Sayen, 244 Pa. 300 (1914), where the Supreme Court of
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At issue in Trevorton was whether the supervisors of Zerbe
Township had the legal authority to enter the township into a con-
tract for a supply of water for fire protection."' The supreme court
held that under a narrow reading of the Township Act the town-
ship did not have the authority to contract for broad police power
purposes. 1 Because the township could exercise only those powers
expressly conferred upon it by statute, the supervisors of Zerbe
Township were precluded from expanding the limited corporate
powers of the township.2 The supreme court concluded that Zerbe
Township could not unilaterally enter into a contract for water
supply.63 Such contracts could only be consummated upon petition
of a majority of the landowners to be benefitted ." The township,
as a quasi-municipal corporation, had no authority to act unilater-
ally and outside the sphere of the Township Act.6 5 Accordingly, the
court reaffirmed the quasi-corporate status of townships.
6 6
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed a similar issue in
Herrington's Petition" and again affirmed the quasi-corporate sta-
tus of townships.6 8 The primary issue before the court was whether
the term "municipal," as used in the Pennsylvania Constitution,
included all government entities authorized to appropriate private
property for public highways.6 9 The court found that the term
Pennsylvania held that "townships of the first class are nothing more than a township, with
some change in the form of government, and with some additional specified powers. They
are not municipal corporations." St. David's Church, 244 Pa. at 302.
60. Trevorton, 259 Pa. at 35. The statute authorized the township supervisors, upon
petition of the owners of a majority of "the lineal feet of frontage along a highway," to enter





64. Trevorton, 259 Pa. at 35.
65. Id. The court cited Haverford Township v. Wilfong, 60 Pa. Super. Ct. 214 (1915).
In Haverford, the superior court opined that the authority of townships under the Township
Act "changed only in respect to certain express powers conferred upon the township com-
missioners." Haverford, 60 Pa. Super. at 219. Among the additional powers granted by the
Township Act the court did not "find any power to legislate generally with respect to the
police power." Id.
66. Trevorton, 259 Pa. at 35. The court stated that townships "are involuntary quasi-
corporations, standing low in the scale of corporate existence and they can exercise only
such powers as are expressly conferred upon them by statute." Id.
67. 266 Pa. 88 (1920).
68. Herrington's Petition, 266 Pa. at 88.
69. Id. at 89. Article XVI, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution stated at the time
that "[m]unicipal and other corporations and individuals invested with the privilege of tak-
ing private property for public use shall make just compensation for property taken, injured
or destroyed by the construction or enlargement of their works, highways, or improve-
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"municipal" included only those municipalities which possess "lo-
cal and subordinate powers of self-government. '70 Townships, the
court held, possess and exercise only such powers as are granted by
the General Assembly and are not municipal corporations.7 1 The
court noted that the Township Act of 1899 was intended to give
residential and urban townships greater powers to effectively con-
front residential problems.72 The greater powers, however, did not
elevate the status of townships to that of boroughs or cities. 73
Townships still lacked any ability to legislate beyond the parame-
ters established by the Township Act.74 This, the court remarked,
distinguished townships from true municipal corporations such as
boroughs and cities.75 Because a township did not possess the at-
tributes of local self-government, the court excluded it from the
definition of "municipal" as enumerated in the constitution's emi-
nent domain clause.
76
After Trevorton and Herrington, it was a well-established princi-
ple in Pennsylvania law that townships were not municipal corpo-
rations. 77 Consequently, the Pennsylvania courts were not con-
fronted with many issues pertaining to the corporate status of
townships.78 It was not until the early 1970's that the status of
townships began to change.
With the passage of the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans
Law79 ("Home Rule Charter") in 1972, the corporate status of
townships became less significant.80 Under the Home Rule Charter,
ments." PA. CONST. art. XVI, § 8 (repealed 1966, current version at PA. CONST. art. 10, § 4).
70. Herrington's Petition, 266 Pa. at 93.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 91-92.
73. Id. at 92.
74. Herrington's Petition, 266 Pa. at 92.
75. Id.
76. Id. See note 69.
77. See Georges Township v. Union Trust Co., 293 Pa. 364 (1928), where the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania distinguished townships from true municipal corporations
such as cities and boroughs. The court held that "townships, like any other quasi municipal
body, may act only through powers that have been conferred on them by the legislature
.Georges Township, 293 Pa. at 368.
78. A lower court stated that "the distinction between true municipalities or munici-
pal corporations, and the quasi municipalities, is now well established and legally recog-
nized. Thus townships, whether of the First or Second Class, are not municipal corporations
but only quasi-municipal corporations, and are therefore not municipalities." In Re:
Milford, Middlecreek and Jefferson Boundary Line, 28 Somerset Legal J. 238 (1973).
79. Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-101
(1974).
80. To allow local municipalities flexibility in the organization and operation of mu-
nicipalities, the Pennsylvania Constitution was amended in 1968 to provide for the adoption
386 Vol. 32:377
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all municipalities in Pennsylvania were permitted to adopt char-
ters as a source of authority for home rule legislation and altera-
tions in local government structure."' More importantly, the Home
Rule Charter defined "municipality" to include counties, cities,
boroughs and townships.82 Now, for the first time, townships and
counties were granted the broad power of self-government and lim-
ited autonomy. 3 The historical and traditional distinction between
municipal corporations and quasi-municipal corporations was be-
coming less apparent. By the mid-1970's, many quasi-municipal
corporations, such as townships, had obtained legislative powers of
such municipal character as to blur the original distinction that
had contrasted the two governmental units for nearly 250 years. 4
In response to the evolving corporate status of townships, the
Pennsylvania General Assembly amended the Statutory Construc-
tion Act to reflect the recent trend."5 The amended definition of
"municipal corporation" was changed to include townships.8 6 In
addition, the definition of "municipality" was also amended to in-
clude townships .8  By the 1980's, Pennsylvania law had erased
of Home Rule. Article 9, § 2, as amended, provided:
Municipalities shall have the right and power to frame and adopt home rule charters.
Adoption, amendment or repeal of a home rule charter shall be by referendum. The
General Assembly shall provide the procedure by which a home rule charter may be
framed and its adoption, amendment, or repeal presented to the electors. If the Gen-
eral Assembly does not so provide, a home rule charter or a procedure for framing
and presenting a home rule charter may be presented to the electors by initiative or
by the governing body of the municipality. A municipality which has a home rule
charter may exercise any power or perform any function not denied by this Constitu-
tion, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time.
PA. CONST. art. IX, §2.
In order to carry out the mandate of article 9, § 2, the General Assembly enacted the
Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law in 1972. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-101 (1974).
81. Gary E. French, Home Rule in Pennsylvania, 81 DICK. L. REV. 265 (1976).
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-102 (1974). The relevant definition states: "Municipal-
ity means a county, city, borough, incorporated town or township." Id.
This definition is also consistent with the amendment made to the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution in 1968. Article 9, § 14 provides: "Municipality means a county, city, borough, incor-
porated town, township or any similar general purpose unit of government which shall here-
after be created by the General Assembly." PA. CONST. art. IX, §14.
83. See 109 THE PENNSYLVANIA Manual 521, December 1989. See also, County of Del-
aware v. Township of Middletown, 511 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1986).
84. See In Re: Milford, Middlecreek and Jefferson Boundary Line, 28 Somerset Legal
Journal 237, 238 (1973). The court noted that "quasi-municipal corporations have been
granted many legislative powers of municipal character" and that "the original distinction
between them and the municipal corporation is somewhat blurred. ... Id. at 241.
85. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1991 (Supp. 1993).
86. Id. See note 23 and accompanying text.
87. . Id. See note 32 and accompanying text.
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many of the distinctions between municipal corporations and
quasi-municipal corporations. Consequently, townships were gen-
erally recognized as municipal corporations."'
In the Patrick Media decision, however, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania refused to consider townships as municipal corpora-
tions.89 The critical issue in the Patrick Media case was whether a
township could be considered an "incorporated municipality" for
purposes under the OAC Act.90 The term "incorporated municipal-
ity" has no legal significance in Pennsylvania because political sub-
divisions have been traditionally classified as either municipal cor-
porations or quasi-municipal corporations. 1  Therefore, the
supreme court believed that it was compelled to utilize definitions
provided by the Statutory Construction Act in order to resolve this
ambiguity.
2
The court faced a dilemma in choosing the proper definition pro-
vided by the Statutory Construction Act. Both the term "munici-
pal corporation" and "municipality" excluded townships as part of
their definitions. 3 It is unclear from the decision what motivated
the court in choosing the term "municipality" over "municipal
corporation."
One logical explanation is that the court attempted to construe
"incorporated municipality" as two distinct, independent terms.
By 1992, it was generally established that townships possess a wide
variety of corporate powers.94 The court even referred to the town-
ships' ability to impose taxes, enact ordinances, file suits and enter
contracts as evidence of "corporate" existence.9 " Therefore, the
court held that townships could be considered "incorporated" for
purposes of the OAC Act.9 6 However, when confronted with con-
struing "municipality," the justices apparently felt obligated to use
88. See In Re Township of Heidelberg For Footpath, 428 A.2d 282 (Pa. 1981).
89. Patrick Media, 620 A.2d at 1127.
90. Id. at 1126.
91. See note 20 and accompanying text.
92. Patrick Media, 620 A.2d at 1127. The QAC Act did not define the term "incorpo-
rated municipality." See note 20. A regulatory definition was provided by PennDOT. See
note 13. It is a well-known rule of statutory construction that interpretive regulations issued
by the administrative agency charged with executing the particular statutory scheme are
entitled great deference. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(8) (Supp. 1993). However, the
supreme court chose to ignore the regulatory definition promulgated by PennDOT and
mechanically applied the definition provided by the Statutory Construction Act.
93. Patrick Media, 620 A.2d at 1127. See notes 23 and 32 and accompanying text.





the applicable definition as provided by the Statutory Construc-
tion Act. 7 A literal reading excluded all townships. 8 Since a town-
ship could not be considered a "municipality," it could not be an
"incorporated municipality" either.9 Using this rather simplistic
reasoning, the supreme court concluded that Ohio Township could
not be considered an "incorporated municipality.' '100 Because Ohio
Township did not qualify as an "incorporated municipality," Pat-
rick Media's proposed billboard would have to be 660 feet from
Interstate 279.101 The mechanical approach taken by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania is not consistent with the legislative intent
surrounding the OAC Act. The OAC Act was enacted to promote
the scenic enhancement and natural beauty of the Common-
wealth's highways. 02 By regulating the number, distance and size
of billboards along highways, the OAC Act was designed to pre-
serve the visual tranquility of the rural Pennsylvania countryside.
Pennsylvania law has traditionally considered townships and
counties as the most effective form of local government in rural
and agrarian areas. s03 One could logically argue that the OAC Act
was targeted toward these rural areas because of the Act's empha-
sis on preserving the "natural beauty" of the commonwealth's
scenic landscape. Excluding all townships from the "incorporated
municipality" exception, however, is not consistent with this goal.
Townships in Pennsylvania are classified as either First Class or
97. Id.
98. See note 32.
99. Patrick Media, 620 A.2d at 1128.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1126.
102. The purpose of the OAC Act is stated at § 2718.102 of the Act. This section
states:
The people of this Commonwealth would suffer economically if the Commonwealth
failed to participate fully in the allocation and apportionment of Federal-aid highway
funds since a reduction in such funds would necessitate increased taxation to support
and maintain the Commonwealth's road program and system. Therefore, for the pur-
pose of assuring the reasonable, orderly, and effective display of outdoor advertising
while remaining consistent with the national policy to protect the public investment
in the interstate and primary systems; to promote the welfare, convenience, and rec-
reational value of public travel; and to preserve natural beauty, it is hereby declared
to be in the public interest to control the erection and maintenance of outdoor adver-
tising devices in areas adjacent to the interstate and primary systems within this
Commonwealth.
PA. STAT. ANN tit. 36, § 2718.102 (Supp. 1993).
103. Wyoming Val. Water Supply Co. v. Public Serv. Com., 159 A. 340 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1932). The court remarked that the township structure "is the only recognized governmental
division in this state for more sparsely settled communities." Wyoming Val. Water Supply,
159 A. at 341.
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Second Class Townships. 104 The classification is based solely on
population density.105 First Class Townships were created to allow
townships to effectively alleviate problems associated with urban
development.106 Consequently, First Class Townships are fre-
quently urban areas. 10 7 On the other hand, Second Class Town-
ships are still regarded as the primary municipal structure for rural
areas.'08 These townships are often sparsely populated and usually
possess tracts of undeveloped or farm-related land. The less
densely populated Second Class Townships, therefore, also possess
more "natural beauty" simply because they are less densely popu-
lated and are primarily rural. Thus, the 660 feet setback mandated
by the OAC Act would seem more applicable to rural townships
than commercially developed urban townships.
The supreme court, however, chose to exclude all townships
from the "incorporated municipality" exception by mechanically
applying the definitions provided by the Statutory Construction
Act. 0 9 This rigid approach violates the practical effect of the OAC
Act. By excluding all townships, the court failed to appreciate the
commercial development of many First Class Townships. It is diffi-
cult to imagine what "natural beauty" is threatened by a billboard
in a rapidly developing urban township. The blanket exclusion of
all townships may inhibit the commercial development of some de-
veloping areas.
After the Patrick Media decision, only cities, boroughs and in-
corporated towns will be considered "incorporated municipalities"
under the OAC Act. Townships are now completely excluded from
this exception. 10 The rigid and mechanical approach taken by the
104. First Class Township Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 55201 (1957).
105. Id.
106. See note 57.
107. 109 THE PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL 524, December 1989.
108. HAROLD F. ALDERFER, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL LIMITATIONS AFFECTING LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA, Part II at 82. (1968).
109. It is interesting to note that Patrick Media appealed solely on the grounds that
no "rational basis" existed to exclude second-class townships from the "incorporated munic-
ipality" exception. Patrick Media, 597 A.2d at 278. As a result of the supreme court's deci-
sion both first-class and second-class townships will now be excluded from the exception.
What effect this will have on billboards previously erected in first-class townships is unclear.
110. According to § 2718.104 of the OAC Act all outdoor advertising devices must be
660 feet from the right of way of an interstate highway. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.104
(Supp. 1993). However, there are exceptions for devices which satisfy the following:
(IV) Outdoor Advertising devices in zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial areas
along those portions of the interstate system constructed on a right of way, any part
of which was acquired on or before July 1, 1956.
(V) Outdoor Advertising devices in areas zoned commercial or industrial along the
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court may produce some illogical and undesired results. In essence,
commercial expansion in the future will be based upon or limited
by zoning laws that were in force as of September 21, 1959. If an
application for a billboard is made in a township, the billboard will
have to be 660 feet from the interstate highway unless the pro-
posed location was zoned industrial or commercial as of September
21, 1959. The "incorporated municipality" exception is no longer
available. An applicant must ignore the present commercial devel-
opment of an area and rely solely on the commercial development
as it existed in 1959. This seems illogical.
When the interstate highway system was designed in the 1950's,
careful attention was given to route the highways away from com-
mercially developed areas. 1 Many interstate highway corridors
passed through exclusively rural and woodland areas. It would
have been undesirable and economically impractical to construct
the interstate system through commercially developed areas. As
noted, townships were considered the most practical municipal
structure for sparsely populated rural areas in Pennsylvania.
Therefore, many interstate highways were constructed in the rural,
woodland corridors of the commonwealth and these areas were
usually townships."1 2 Logic indicates that in 1959 these areas would
have been zoned either agricultural, woodland or residential. They
would not have been zoned industrial or commercial because many
interstate highways were specifically designed to avoid urban, com-
mercialized areas. Unless the present billboard location was zoned
industrial or commercial as of September 21, 1959, the billboard
must be 660 feet from the interstate. All hope must be placed on
the notion that the present location was somehow zoned industrial
or commercial in 1959. This is highly unlikely.
By excluding all townships from the "incorporated municipality"
interstate system and lying within the boundaries of any incorporated municipality as
such boundaries existed on September 21, 1959, and devices located in any other area
which, as of September 21, 1959 was clearly established by law as industrial or
commercial.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2718.104 (Supp. 1993).
111. See PHILLIP H. BURCH, JR., HIGHWAY REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES, Rutgers University Press (1962). Property values increase with the intensity
of land use. Thus, the cost of acquiring a right of way would be substantially higher in
urban areas than in rural regions. Id. at 26.
112. Pennsylvania ranks fourth among the fifty states in the number of rural inter-
state miles. As of December 31, 1990, Pennsylvania had approximately 1,166 miles of inter-
state classified as rural. Only Texas, California, and Illinois have more miles of interstate
classified as rural. Sallie Gaines, The Roads that Changed America, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20,
1991, at 1.
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exception, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania unwittingly limited
economic opportunity in the 1990's to whatever commercial growth
an area had achieved more than thirty years ago. This odd circum-
stance could have been avoided had the drafters of the OAC Act
simply defined "incorporated municipality" within the Act itself. A
definition that would have included cities, boroughs, incorporated
towns and first-class townships would have effectuated the legisla-
tive intent much more effectively than the inflexible course chosen
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The social interests of
scenic preservation must be balanced against the capitalistic forces
of commercial development and economic opportunity. The Pat-
rick Media decision produces a result that achieves neither of
these goals.
Robert J. Burnett
